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Abstract 
This paper presents a model of waste product trade between a developed and a 
developing country. North firms produce products that are consumed exclusively in 
North. After consumption, parts of them are exported from North to South. This export 
may be illegal. The remaining portion of the waste products are collected and recycled 
by firms in North. Firms in South engage exclusively only in recycling. The South 
government is unable to find illegal dumping of recycled waste products because of an 
inadequate governance capacity.  Therefore, we assume that the South government 
subsidizes recycled material. 
The model addresses five scenarios: closed economy, the first best, strategic 
government, selfish North government and inactive South government, and benevolent 
North government and inactive South government. 
Among these scenarios, only the first best outcome needs a negative tariff for 
waste-product import to South. A limitation of the strategic government case is that the 
South government must finance the subsidy. In the selfish North government case, 
North benefits by avoiding collection and recycling costs by outflow of waste into 
South. The South environment, however, would enormously deteriorate due to the 
absence of a policy. If the North government is benevolent, it imposes an export tax on 
waste products to South to curb it. 
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Introduction 
The waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) directed by the European 
Union (EU) requires that a producer recycles its own products in EU regions. Japan’s 
WEEE recycling system also requires products to be recycled within the country. 
However, recycling is incomplete within the consuming country. Post-consumer 
products are legally or illegally exported from developed to developing countries. For 
example, Fuse et al. (2011) estimate that more than 50% of indium and 20–30% of 
barium, lead, antimony, strontium, zirconium, silver, gold, and tin in domestically 
discarded products are not recycled in Japan, but instead are exported to other Asian 
countries. Kellenberg (2012) empirically shows the international waste haven effects 
that include the export of physical waste by-products, rather than goods production, to 
low environmental regulation countries. 
  There have been many studies on recycling within a country. Fullerton and Kinnaman 
(1995) propose a deposit-refund system with a tax on output and with a rebate on proper 
disposal. Palmer and Walls (1997) present a formal theoretical model on 
production-recycling. It is a pioneering study on waste and recycling, but is limited to 
domestic recycling. Walls and Palmer (2001) extend the previous model in order to 
formulate the so-called integrated product policy by treating three externalities: waste 
by-product, emission, and waste. The central issue in waste research is that the first best 
policy is prevented by illegal disposal and dumping. Therefore, waste-recycling policies 
to achieve the second best have been explored by many authors. Shinkuma (2003) 
shows that the second best policy among the three policies (unit pricing with an advance 
disposal fee, a deposit-refund system, and a producer take-back requirement system) 
depends on the price of the recycled good and the marginal transaction cost. Koide 
(2008) investigates optimal sets of take-back fees for collecting and recycling, and fines 
for illegal dumping in order to analyze the situation under Japan’s Home Appliance 
Recycling Law. Honma and Chang (2010) examine recycling with and without 
cooperation of oligopoly firms. They show that virgin material taxes or final disposal 
taxes discourage firms from engaging in recycling R&D efforts in normal situations, 
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regardless of R&D cooperation. Ino (2011) allows for the possibility of firms’ illegal 
disposal and advocates a second-best deposit-refund system.  
Although recycling activities reach beyond national borders, there are fewer studies 
on international recycling than on the domestic recycling referenced above. Copeland 
(1991) shows that trade restrictions on waste disposal enhance welfare when firms 
illegally dispose waste. Cassing and Kuhn (2003) formulate a model for international 
trade in hazardous waste where waste-importing and waste-exporting countries 
cooperate strategically. Higashida and Jinji (2006) study the strategic use of recycled 
content standard in an international duopoly. Kinnaman and Yokoo (2011) investigate a 
tax-subsidy system on durable goods, which are consumed as new goods in a developed 
country and as second-hand goods in a developing country. Shinkuma and Managi 
(2011, Chapter 8) analyze international trade in second-hand goods and scraps between 
developed and developing countries. They state that an extended product responsibility 
(EPR) policy in a developed country is nationally but not globally optimal.  
Despite several papers’ analyses of international-reuse trade, international recycling 
that has been actually performed has not been analyzed theoretically. This paper 
presents a North–South recycling trade model. In this model, there are two 
countries—developed North and developing South. North firms produce products 
exclusively for North consumption. After consumption, parts of them are exported from 
North to South. This export may be done illegally. The remaining portion of the waste 
products are collected and recycled by firms in North. South firms engage exclusively 
in recycling. However, the South government cannot find illegal dumping of residuals 
after recycling because of an inadequate governance capacity. Therefore, we assume 
that South subsidizes recycled material.  
The model addresses five scenarios: closed economy, the first best, strategic 
government, selfish North government and inactive South government, and benevolent 
North government and inactive South government. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our model. Section 3 
presents optimal policies under five different scenarios. Section 4 compares tax-subsidy 
rates among the five outcomes. Section 5 concludes. 
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Figure 1 Production and recycling process in North and South 
 
 
1. Model 
 There are two countries, North and South.  Due to differences in technology, the end 
product is produced exclusively in North using two production factors (labor and 
capital); however, waste product is recycled in both countries. An outline of our model 
is shown in Figure 1. 
 
1.1 Production and recycling in North 
In North, there are n identical perfectly-competitive firms. A representative firm in 
North produces units of a final consumer good, x , by using labor, 
NL , and capital, 
NK . Let ),(
NN KLf be the production function. We assume that the production 
function is strictly concave, that is, 
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positive, 0 KLLK ff
1
. We assume that each firm in North has to collect and recycle 
its own waste products in compliance with the EPR policy of the North government.  
Some randomly chosen North consumers sell used products to waste-product 
exporters. This amount is given by z . The per unit export cost is given as yp . For 
simplicity, the exporters are located in North and face perfect competition
2
. To 
concentrate on the environmental damage caused by final disposal waste in both 
countries, we do not treat second-hand demand in South
3
. Therefore, North firms 
recycle parts of the products, that is, zxy
N  . Without loss of generality, we assume 
that the number of units equal its volume for x , 
Ny , and z , respectively. We do not 
consider illegal disposal by North consumers. We assume that North firms collect waste 
products except those exported to South, and that North consumers do not illegally 
dispose used products. Note that North firms cannot directly control 
Ny , which 
depends on recycling demand in South. North firms’ recycling function is given by, 
),( NNN ylr , where 
Nl  is labor for the recycling process. We assume that the recycling 
function is strictly concave, that is, 0)(,0,0,0,0
2  Nly
N
yy
N
ll
N
yy
N
ll
N
y
N
l rrrrrrr , 
and that the cross derivatives are positive, 0 Nyl
N
ly rr . Note that 
N
yr  is always less 
than unity, because a firm cannot extract any additional weight of recycled material 
beyond one unit of the waste product. The recycled material is sold at a constant price,
 
q , in the market. The final disposal waste, ),( NNN lyrzx  , is taxed at the waste tax 
rate, 
Nt . Firms take the price of output, P, the price of labor, Nw , and the price of 
capital, Kp  as given.  Let c  be the collection cost per unit. A representative firm’s 
profit in North is written as follows:  
)),(,()(),( , zKLflqrKplLwKLPf NNNiNNKNNN
NNN   
)).),(,(),(()),(( zKLflrzKLftzKLfc NNNNNNNNN 
     
(1) 
The first-order conditions of the profit maximization are as follows
4
: 
                                                   
1 Subscripts denote partial derivatives. 
2 Assuming the constant marginal cost and perfect competition on discarded products, 
which country the exporting firms belong to does not affect our results.  
3  The second-hand good consumed in country South will be finally recycled and 
landfilled. To avoid complexity by introducing consumer surplus from the second-hand 
goods, we exclusively deal with used products. 
4 We assume that second-order conditions hold throughout the paper. 
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)1( NyL
N
LL
N
yNL rftcffqrwPf  ,                              (2) 
  
)1( NyK
N
KK
N
y
K
K rftcffqrpPf  ,                             (3) 
  
N
l
N
N
N
l rtwqr  .                                               (4) 
 
1.2 Recycling in South 
In South, m identical firms engage exclusively in recycling because we assume that 
production technology in unavailable in South and because recycling is labor intensive. 
A representative South firm purchases a waste product, Sy , from North exporters for a 
constant price yp . Then, zmny
S )/(
 
holds. South recycling activity is described by 
a recycling function, ),( SSS ylr . South firms extract recycled material,
 
),( SSS ylr , 
from Sy , using labor 
Sl . The recycling function of South firms is strictly concave, 
that is, 0)(,0,0,0,0
2  Sly
S
yy
S
ll
S
yy
S
ll
S
y
S
l rrrrrrr and 0
S
yl
S
ly rr .  
Because of inadequate administrative capacities of the South government, it cannot 
impose a fine for illegal dumping of the residuals or a tax on final disposal of waste. 
South firms can dispose the residual without a cost or fine. We assume that the South 
government can introduce only two policy instruments in order to alleviate 
environmental damage by final disposal of waste and illegal dumping after recycling.  
First, the South government subsidizes the residual, ),( SSSS ylry  , after recycling 
it at the subsidized rate, S . Because there is no fine for illegal dumping in South, 
when 0S , South firms freely dispose the residuals. Let Sl and Sy be the business as 
usual, with labor input and waste product purchased by the representative South firm 
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when 0S , respectively. If 0S , the firm recycles ),( SSSS ylrr   to extract 
recycling resources but disposes the rest, SS ry  , which is the amount of the residuals 
without a policy. When 0S , the South firm receives the subsidy, 
))),(()(( SSSSSSS ylryry  . For simplicity, the South government properly 
disposes ),( SSSS ylry  . 
Second, the South government introduces a tariff on a waste product imported from 
North with the tariff rate, 
y . An South firm’s profit is written as follows:  
))),(()(()(),( SSSSSSSSyySS
SSSS ylryryyplwylqr   .   (5) 
 
The first-order conditions are  
S
l
S
S
S
l rwqr  ,                                                 
(6) 
)1( Sy
SyyS
y rpqr   .                                         (7) 
In (6) and (7), the marginal revenue of each input equals the marginal cost including the 
tariff and subsidy.  
 
1.3 Welfare 
Let )(QP  be the demand function of the product in North, where ),(
NN KLnfQ  . 
We assume that 0)(  QP . North welfare is defined as  
)),(,()()(
),(
0
SNNNNNkNN
N
KLnf
N y
n
m
KLflnqrKnplLnwdQQPW    
))),(,(),(()),(( , SSNNNNNNN
SNNiN myy
n
m
KLflnrKLnfDy
n
m
KLfnc  , (8) 
where )(ND  is the environmental cost associated with residuals in North . South 
welfare is defined as  
)),(( SS
SySSSS lwypylqrmW      
                                                                          
 
)),(()1()),((,
SSSS
S
SSSS
ILLS ylmrmyDylmrmyD   ,            (9) 
where )(, ILLSD is environmental cost when the residuals are illegally disposed and 
)(SD  is environmental cost when the residuals are properly disposed by the South 
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government.  The later includes the government’s disposal cost.  The parameter   
denotes whether illegal dumping has taken place. If the South firm engages in illegal 
dumping, then 1 . Otherwise, 0 . To account for the difference of pollution 
abatement technology between North and South, and the difference of pollution 
between legal and illegal disposal in South, we presume that )()()( , uDuDuD ILLSSN   
and )()()( , uDuDuD ILLSSN  for all u. 
 
2. Results  
2.1 Closed North economy case: Trade liberalization of waste products  
As a benchmark, we consider the case where production as well as recycling is 
carried out in North and no waste-product trade takes place between the two countries. 
A simple calculation yields a standard Pigovian tax, 
)( NCNCN
NC nrnyDt  , 
where NCy  and NCr are the corresponding production and recycled material in North.  
What happens when waste product is traded? An increase in Sy  must raise the 
North firm’s profit due to a drop in collection and recycling cost, which in turn, may 
result in an increase in output. Therefore, waste product leakage into South causes the 
output enhancing effect, Sdydx / >0, and the recycling damping effect, SN dydy / <0. 
One or both effects may occur. This depends on the curvatures of production and 
recycling functions.  
 Needless to say, if )0(SD  
is extraordinary large, the closed North economy is the first 
best. If so, the first best policy set includes a Pigovian tax in North and a ban of the 
waste-product trade. This is an uninteresting case because the international waste-trade 
problem has vanished. Therefore, we presume that the closed North economy cannot be 
the first best. 
 
2.2 The first best case 
In the first best case, we consider a policy that maximizes the joint welfare, 
SN WWW  . To avoid illegal dumping in South, we assume a positive value of S . 
Therefore, the joint welfare to be maximized is  
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)),(,()()(
),(
0
SNNNNNkNN
N
KLnf
y
n
m
KLflnqrKnplLnwdQQPW    
))),(,(),(()),(( , SSNNNNNNN
SNNiN myy
n
m
KLflnrKLnfDy
n
m
KLfnc 
      
)),(()),(( SSSSS
S
S
SySSS ylmrmyDlwypylqrm  .               (10) 
Maximizing with respect to SSNNN ylKlL ,,,, yields the following first-order 
conditions:  
))1(( Nz
N
LN
N
L
N
L
N
zN
N
L
E rfDcffqrwfP  ,                      (11) 
))1(( Nz
N
KN
N
K
N
K
N
z
KN
K
E rfDcffqrpfP  ,
                      
(12) 
N
lNN
N
l rDwqr  ,                                              
(13) 
)1()1( SyS
N
yN
N
y
yS
y rDrDcqrpqr  ,                         (14) 
S
lSS
S
l rDwqr  ,                                               
(15) 
where EP  satisfies the market-clearing price for the product market in North. 
Equations (11) to (15) state that the marginal social benefit should equal the marginal 
social cost. For example, the value of marginal product of labor equals the sum of 
wages, marginal collecting cost, and marginal environmental damage, minus the value 
of marginal recycled material. Combining the above welfare maximization with the 
profit-maximizing first-order conditions, we obtain the following tax-subsidy rates: 
)( ****** NNN
N ryDt  ,                                          (16)
 
)( ****** SSSS ryD  ,                                            
(17) 
)()1( ********** NNN
N
y
N
y ryDrcqr  ,                          
(18)
 
where “**” denotes tax and subsidy rates on the first best case, and 
),( ****** NNNy
N
y ylrr  . Obviously, 
**Nt
 
and **S  are the Pigovian tax and subsidy in 
North and South, respectively. The absolute value of **  is the marginal social cost of 
one unit of waste product, which equals the sum of the marginal environmental damage 
and the collection cost, minus the revenue from the recycled material sold. If the sign of 
**  is positive, an additional one unit of waste product generates positive social benefit. 
This cannot occur at the optimum level. The sign of
 
**  should be negative. The 
negative import tariff seems to be irregular; however, it is required to adjust the 
difference of marginal social costs between the two countries. Furthermore, if this 
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negative import tariff is absent, North firms produce less than the optimum because of 
burden of waste tax. A part of the subsidy in South, )( ****** SSS rym   may be financed 
by the tax revenue, )( ****** NNN rznt  , in North. 
 
2.3 Strategic case 
In a strategic case, each country’s government maximizes its own welfare and does 
not take into account a spillover effect to the foreign country. The first-order conditions 
of welfare maximization in North are 
))1(( NyLNLL
N
zNL rfDcffqrwPf  ,                          (19) 
))1(( NyKNKK
N
y
K
K rfDcffqrpPf  ,                          (20) 
N
lNN
N
l rDcwqr  ,                                           
(21) 
Combining the above welfare maximization with the profit-maximizing first-order 
conditions for North, we obtain the following strategic tax rate.  
)( *** NNN
N nrnyDt                                            (22) 
“*” denotes tax and subsidy rates in the strategic case. The first-order conditions of 
welfare maximization in South are 
S
lSS
S
l rDwqr  ,                                              
(23) 
)1( SyS
yS
z rDpqr  .                                          
(24) 
Combining the above welfare maximization with the profit-maximizing first-order 
conditions for South, we obtain the following strategic subsidy and tariff rates: 
)( *** SSSS mrmyD  ,                                           
(25) 
0*  .                                                       (26) 
Note that South must finance ))()(( SSSSS ryrym   to subsidize firms. 
 
Proposition 1 The amount of waste product imported by South in the first best case is 
greater than that in the strategic case.  
 
Proof  
Applying Cramer’s rule to (6) and (7), we obtain  
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0
1
0

S
yy
S
yl
S
ly
S
ll
S
ly
S
ll
y
S
d
dy





.                                              (27) 
The sign of the numerator is negative while that of the denominator is positive because 
it is the Hessian of the South profit function. Because *** 0   , we conclude that 
***
SS yy  . QED 
 
Note that the results of the strategic case are identical to the Stackelberg case in 
which North is the leader and South is the follower because the demand of South for the 
waste product is not affected by North actions.  This is determined by the marginal 
recycling values of waste and labor in South.  
Again applying Cramer’s rule to (6) and (7), we obtain  
0
0
1

S
yy
S
yl
S
ly
S
ll
S
yy
S
ly
S
S
dw
dl




,                                             (28) 
0
0
1

S
yy
S
yl
S
ly
S
ll
S
ly
S
ll
S
S
dw
dy




,                                            
 
(29) 
We state the following proposition.  
 
Proposition 2 An increase in the wage rate of South decreases labor and waste product 
demand, and then improves South environment in both strategic and first best cases.  
 
2.4 Selfish policy in North and no policy in South 
 We assume that the South government does not implement an environmental or trade 
policy due to its administrative limitations—a valid assumption for least developing 
countries.  Therefore, only the North government implements policies. In this and the 
  
12 
 
next subsection, the residuals after recycling in South are exclusively disposed by illegal 
dumping. Hence, environmental damage in South is given by )(, ILLSD  and the 
parameter is set by 1 . In this subsection, we consider that the North government is 
selfish and maximizes its own welfare. This case is the same as the closed economy 
case except that the waste product is exported to South. The North government 
implements the Pigovian tax, )( NSelfNSelfN
NSelf nrnyDt  . “NSelf” denotes the selfish 
North government. In this case, the first-order conditions of the South firm are rewritten 
as 
S
S
l wqr  ,                                                     (30) 
yS
y pqr  .                                                     
(31) 
Due to the lack of subsidy, the South environment deteriorates due to the illegal 
dumping of residuals.  
 
2.5 Benevolent policy in North and no policy in South 
This subsection considers the North government as benevolent and the South 
government remains with no policy. Due to the absence of a policy in South, the value 
of marginal recycling of labor should equal the South wage rate. Then the North 
government should solve the following constrained maximization problem,  
Max )( SlS qrwW  ,                                           
 (32) 
where 
 
is a Lagrange multiplier. The first-order conditions on 
NNN lKL ,,  are the 
same as the non-constrained case. The rest of the first-order conditions on South 
follows: 
)( ,,,
NBenevSNBenevS
ILLS
S
lS
S
ll
S
l mrmyDrwqr
m
qr 

,
 
                    (33)  
])()1([ Ny
NBenevNBenev
N
N
y
yS
ly
S
y qrnrnyDrcpqr
m
qr 

.    
)()1( ,,,
NBenevSNBenevS
ILLS
S
y mrmyDr                              (34) 
“NBenev” denotes the benevolent North government case. 
 
is marginal welfare by 
an additional increase in South wage rate. Equations (33) and (34) indicate that the 
marginal social benefit equals the marginal social cost. In (33), the left-hand side 
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represents the marginal social benefit of the labor of South, which comprises the 
marginal recycling value of labor and its marginal increase of labor in the optimum. The 
right-hand side represents the marginal social cost, which is South wage rate minus the 
marginal environmental damage caused by the additional recycling labor. In (34), the 
left-hand side represents the marginal social benefit of the waste product in South, 
which comprises the marginal recycling value of waste product and its marginal 
increase of recycling labor productivity caused by the additional waste product in the 
optimum. The right-hand side represents export cost, alleviated marginal social cost in 
North
5
, and marginal environmental damage caused by the additional waste product. 
Because of the constraint, SlS qrw  , (33) is reduced to ILLS
S
l
S
ll Drqrm ,)/(  . Then,  
S
ll
S
lILLS
qr
rDm , .                                               (35) 
The sign of 
 
is negative. We state the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 3 If the North government is benevolent, an increase in the wage rate of 
South reduces the sum of the welfares of North and South on account of added 
recycling in South.  
 
The reason behind Proposition 3 is that the benevolent North government chooses its 
policy based on the amount of recycling labor available in South dependent on South 
wage rate. A rising South wage rate provokes additional labor in recycling activity in 
South and, in turn, causes more extensive illegal dumping.  
We assume that )(,  ILLSD  is sufficiently large in the range considered; therefore, the 
sign of 
S
lyILLS
S
y
N
yN
N
y qrmDrqrDrc )/()1(])1([ ,   
which is obtained after 
some manipulation of (34) is positive. Consider that the benevolent North government 
introduces an export tax on waste products
6
. Let 
NBenevT be the export tax rate on waste 
                                                   
5 The square bracket in the right-hand side in (34) represents the marginal social cost 
of waste product in North. It is alleviated through an additional waste product from 
North to South. It is reasonable to presume that the sign of the square bracket is 
positive. 
6 We allow the possibility that trade on waste product is illegal, and in violation of the 
  
14 
 
products to South. By (34), the optimal 
NBenevT  is given by 
NBenevS
lyILLS
NBenevS
y
NBenev
yN
NBenev
y
NBenev qr
m
DrqrDrcT ,,
, )1(])1([


    
(36) 
where ),( NBenevNBenevNy
NBenev
y ylrr  , ),(
,,, NBenevSNBenevSS
y
NBenevS
y ylrr  , and 
),( ,,, NBenevSNBenevSNBenevSly ylr . The benevolent North government controls waste products 
by its export tax together with the usual Pigovian tax within the country. 
)( NBenevNBenevN
NBenev ryDt  .                                      (37) 
 
3. Discussion 
Table 1 summarizes the tax-subsidy system for the five scenarios. Only the first best 
outcome needs a negative tariff for the import of waste products to South. In the 
strategic government case, one problem is that the South government must finance the 
subsidy. In the selfish North government case, North benefits by avoiding collection and 
recycling costs by outflow of waste into South. The South environment, however, would 
enormously deteriorate due to the absence of a policy. Considering the responsibility of 
developed countries, when South implements no policy, the North government should 
adopt the benevolent policy that contains the export tax to curb the inflow of waste 
products to South.  
  
                                                                                                                                                     
Basel Convention up to here. However, when the export tax on waste product is 
considered, we assume that trade on waste product is legal. 
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Table 1 Tax-subsidy systems for five scenarios 
Scenario Government  Optimal policy 
Closed 
economy 
North is a 
closed 
economy. 
South is no 
activity. 
0)(  NCNCN
NC nrnyDt
 
0 NCNCS   
First best Social planner 
maximizes the 
sum of North 
and South 
welfares. 
0)( ******  NNN
N nrnyDt
 
0)( ******  SSSS mrmyD  
)()1( ********** NNN
N
y
N
y nrnyDrqr   
0 c  
Strategic 
governments 
Each 
government 
maximizes 
their own 
welfare. 
0)( ***  NNN
N nrnyDt
 
0)( ***  SSSS mrmyD  
0*   
Selfish North 
government 
North 
government 
maximizes 
own welfare. 
South has no 
policy.  
0)(  NSelfNSelfN
NSelf nrnyDt
 
0 NSelfNSelfS   
Benevolent 
North 
government 
North 
government 
maximizes the 
joint welfare. 
South has no 
policy. 
0)(  NBenevNBenevN
NBenev nrnyDt
 
))()1(( NBeney
NBenevNBenev
N
NBenev
y
NBenev qrnrnyDrcT 
 
0)()1( ,,,,
,  NBenevSly
NBenevSNBenevS
ILLS
NBenevS
y qr
m
mrmyDr

 
0 NBenevNBenevS   
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4. Conclusions  
 This paper presents a model of waste product trade between a developed and a 
developing country. We find that the negative import tariff is required to adjust the 
difference of marginal social costs between the two countries in the first best case.  If 
the North government is selfish, North benefits by avoiding collection and recycling 
costs by outflow of waste into South.  In this case, if possible, the South government 
should subsidize the residual after recycling to prevent the illegal dumping.  If the 
North government is benevolent and the South has no policy, the North government 
should impose an export tax on waste products to South to curb environmental damage 
resulting from the illegal dumping in South together with the domestic Pigovian tax.  
 In our model, the North government and firms cannot observe whether the waste 
products exported are properly disposed of in South. If a traceability system of waste 
flow is available in both countries, improper recycling in South can be controlled with 
more effective policy instruments. 
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